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NOTES
Ev-EcE-REs

GEsTAE--SoNTANEous

DECLARATION

AS EXCEPTION

TO THE HEARSAY

RULE-PRIMA FACE CASE MADE OuT.-In a consolidated action for personal injuries
and wrongful death, the Court of Appeals in a recent decision' modified the Appellate
Division's dismissal of a complaint 2 and held that a prima fade case had been made
out by the plaintiffs. In sending the case back for a retrial, the Court indicated that
the case presented a "classic example" of res gestae evidence.
Ward La France Truck Corporation agreed to supply the defendant Despatch
Company a used tractor and trailor, reconditioned by Ward and attested to by Ward's
secretary as being in perfect condition for a trial run, with the understanding that
Despatch would buy it if it was found satisfactory.
Trimboli, a truck driver for Despatch, who was to make the trial run from New
York City to Plattsburgh, invited the plaintiff Swensson to accompany him. On the
return trip, the following day, while the truck was moving at the speed of about
forty-five miles per hour and was on a slight incline, Trimboli attempted to apply
both the air brakes and emergency brakes, but without result. He told Miss Swensson,
within the ten to twenty seconds that elapsed between his first unsuccessful attempt
to brake the truck and the accident, that the regular brakes "didn't work," and that
the air for the foot brakes was "gone". The truck oveturned, killing the driver and
severely injuring Miss Swensson.
Ward's mechanic testified that he had repaired the truck; that he had put it
through a test run of forty miles before delivering it to Despatch; and that both
brakes were then in good working condition. Expert testimony was offered on behalf
of the plaintiff Trimboli to the effect that if the air brakes were in good working
order the truck would have stopped within fifteen to twenty feet; that it is not good
practice to put a truck on the road without examining the brake drum, and that such
examination is impossible without removing the drum. A witness for Ward, a mechanic in its employ, although conceding that he had not removed the drum, asserted
that such practice is unnecessary when a truck has been driven as little as 18,000
miles, as had this one. An eye witness testified that the truck had been driven faultlessly until it went down the incline. At the trial defendant Ward objected to the
admission of plaintiff Trimboli's statement that "the air was gone," on the ground of
hearsay, but the statement was admitted.
Upon allthe evidence, the jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs, based upon
defendant Ward's negligence in inspection and repair, but exonerated Despatch.
The Appellate Division, by a divided court, although accepting all the evidence,
reversed the lower court and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to establish a prima facie case. The court
indicated that, were it not dismissing, it would have granted a new trial, as the verdict was contrary to the weight of credible evidence.
The Court of Appeals had to decide two questions: one, whether the driver's
statement that the air was "gone" should be excluded on the ground of hearsay; and
two, if such evidence were admissible, as both the trial court and the Appellate
Division had held, whether a prima fade case had been made out by the plaintiff.
In the instant case, the most telling evidence against the defendant was the remark of the deceased driver immediately preceding the accident that the air was
"gone".

1 Swensson v. New York, Albany Despatch Company, 309 N. Y. 497 (1956).

2 285 App. Div. 1078, 139 N. Y. 2d 711 (2d Dep't 1955).
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One of the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule is a declaration which is part
of the res gestae. The res gestae declaration is one born of a situation which presents
a startling occurrence sufficient to produce so spontaneous a verbal or behavior reaction as to preclude the fabrication which would render it inadmissible.3
The facts generally deemed significant in determining whether a statement may
be considered a spontaneous declaration are: interval of time between the statement
and occurrence; form of statement; whether it was elicited in response to a question;'
physical and mental condition of the declarant; and its relevance to the main transaction. 4
In People v. Curtis,5 the defendant, who was convicted of hit-and-run driving,
sought to exclude the testimony of an eyewitness who had been awakened by the
crash to see a car drive away and the victim crawling to the sidewalk, moaning, "Oh
my God, get me a doctor!" The statement was shown to have been made within
a few moments of the crash. It was admitted as part of the res gestae.
However, a contrary result was reached in Handel v. New York Rapid Transit
Company,6 where the deceased, who had been caught in aLsubway door, was dragged
for five blocks. Within two or three minutes, he was found by a witness, who heard
plaintiff say, "Save me-Help me-Why did that conductor close the door on me?"
While the lapse of time may be an indication of a non-spontaneous declaration,
the courts will sometimes distinguish in their opinions between the mere lapse of
time and the opportunity to fabricate, which is at the root of the res gestae standard.
Thus, in Scheir v. Quirin,7 the plaintiff, who had been severely scalded when the
plank upon which he had been standing slipped and he fell into a vat of boiling
alcohol, ran a distance of about seventy feet while in intense pain, and screamed, "Oh
George, I am scalded, the plank slipped and throwed me in". The intense pain
suffered by the plaintiff from the time of the accident to the statement, even though
it was a matter of two or more minutes, was held to preclude any other than an
impulsive or instinctive statenient, and it was admitted as part of the res gestae.
As to a statement being elicited by a query rather than one initiated by the
declarant, again the decisions seem to be non-uniform. In one instance, the deceased
took four or five steps after being stabbed, and in response to the witness who asked
him, "What happened?" he said, "Del Vermo stabbed me." This declaration was admitted as part of the res gestae. 8 Yet the ruling in Greener v. Electric CompanyO excluded a statement of the plaintiff, who had fallen from a ladder which had buckled
under his weight. As he lay there, a fellow workman asked him what had happened
and the plaintiff answered, "My feet is broken, the ladder bent over". The opinion
indicated that a distinction must be made between spontaneous answers to questions,
and answers which take the form of a narrative and are not spontaneous.10
These illustrations indicate that what may constitute a spontaneous declaration
varies markedly with the facts and circumstances of each individual case, and its admissibility rests very largely with the discretion of the trial judge.1 1 In many jurisdictions there is a marked tendency to extend rather than to narrow the scope
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

20 A.m. JuR., Evidence § 662 (1936).
See Note, 10 BROOXY= L. Rav. 282 (1941).
225 N. Y. 519, 122 N. E. 623 (1913).
277 N. Y. 548, 13 N. E. 2d 468 (1937).
177 N. Y. 568, 69 N. E. 1130 (1902).
People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908).
209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E. 527 (1913).
10 Id. at 138, 102 N. E. 527, 529.
11 32 C. J. S. Evidence § 403 (1942).
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of the doctrine; 12 whereas
in New York, the later cases seem to indicate a strict
13
attitude towards its use.
In the instant case, where the statement was simultaneous with the accident, the
Court of Appeals allowed the statement to remain as part of the res gestae. Such evi14
dence being admissible, the court held that a prima fade case had been made out,
and indicated that despite evidence showing that the brakes had been operating
efficiently prior to the accident, it could not say that by "no rational process" could
the jury have based a finding in favor of the plaintiffs on the basis of the evidence
presented.
In admitting the statement, the Court of Appeals declared the statement an almost
"classic example" of res gestae, made in the course of and within ten seconds of the
event itself. Its admission by the court probably did not liberalize the strict New
York rule as to hearsay, but rather indicates the extreme spontaneity and relevance
necessary for a statement to fall within the spontaneous declaration exception.

CONpLiCT oi

LAWS-DomESTIC RELATIoNs-Wil'S DIVORCE ACTION NOT BARRED BY
HusBaq's SISTER STATE DIvORCE DECREE WHERE HUSBAND FALsELY STATED W 'S ADDRESS TO OBTAIN PUBLICATION ORDER.-The Appellate Division, Third Department, in

unanimously affirming a judgment of divorce, has held that the defendant spouse could
not set up as a bar the prior divorce he had obtained in Pennsylvania. In what appears
to be a case of factual novel impression in New York, the court held the foreign decree
void because the husband in obtaining it had deliberately falsified the wife's address
in obtaining an order of service by publication. 1
The parties were married in 1947, in Binghamton, New York, where they lived
together as man and wife until 1952, at which time they separated, the wife remaining
in New York and the husband moving to Hallstead, Pennsylvania. In 1953, the husband
instituted divorce proceedings in Pennsylvania, alleging that the wife had deserted him,
and had been absent from their habitation since 1951. He further alleged that his
wife's last known address was Snake Creek, RD # 1 Hallstead, and that her present
.whereabouts were unknown to him. Undisputed evidence showed that the wife had
never lived in Pennsylvania, that her husband knew her New York address, and in fact
had been sending alimony checks in a pending New York action to her there.
The necessary papers were sent to the wife at the address given by her husband,
and were returned marked "unclaimed and unknown". Service by publication was
authorized and notice of the action was published in two Scranton newspapers. A
divorce was granted to the husband, who remarried shortly thereafter.
The wife, learning of the divorce some time later, instituted an action for divorce
in New York, the husband pleading in defense his prior decree in Pennsylvania. In
the New York Supreme Court, judgment was for plaintiff wife, granting the divorce.
In affirming the judgment, the Appellate Division held that "defendant's fraud
vitiated the service of process which was attempted to be made in accordance with the
false information supplied by him. The Pennsylvania Court therefore never obtained
jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the judgment of the Pennsylvania Court may be
collaterally attacked in this state."
12

Ibid.

Is

RICHmSON, EvIrENcE § 263 (8th ed. 1955).
14 See Sagorsky v. Malyon, 307 N. Y. 584, 123 N. E. 2d 79 (1954).

I Hoyt v. Hoyt, 286 App. Div. 580, 146 N. Y. S. 2d (3d Dep't 1955).
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The United States Constitution provides that "full faith and credit shall be given
in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state".2
Early judicial decisions held this article applicable to final judgments of courts of record.3 Later cases effected a modification of this doctrine by holding its observance
not mandatory where the court rendering judgment lacked jurisdiction. 4
Simple in its statement, this concept has ever been complex in its application to the
sui generis actions of separation and divorce. As long as the American courts adhered
to the common law doctrine that a married woman was not sui juris, and could therefore have no domicile separate from that of her husband,5 there was no problem: the
court either had jurisdiction over both husband and wife, or neither. However, it was
held in the early Rhode Island case of Ditson v. Ditson6 that a wife abandoned in New
York could move to Rhode Island and give the Rhode Island court jurisdiction over
a divorce action instituted by her. This case is significant because it is apparently the
first one in which the state's interest in the marriage was treated as a res within the
state. Fourteen years later, in Cheever v. Wilson,7 the Supreme Court of the United
States adopted this view, that either spouse could acquire a domicile separate from the
other for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction. This was shortly to become the doctrine
applied almost uniformly throughout the United States. 8
The courts of New York, however, tempered their acceptance of this doctrine
by adhering to a firm policy of non-recognition of foreign divorces where the decreegranting state did not acquire in personam jurisdiction over the defendant spouse.
This was the holding in an 1879 bigamy prosecution, 9 although the New York court
in that case expressly conceded that the foreign divorce was effective in the foreign jurisdiction as to the status of the plaintiff. This remained the law of New York 10 until the
Supreme Court of the United States, reversing the New York Court of Appeals in
Atherton v. Atherton,1 1 held that New York had to recognize a divorce obtained by
the husband in the matrimonial domicile, even though there was no in personam jurisdiction over the wife. The force of this holding was somewhat modified several years
later by the Supreme Court in Haddock v. Haddock,12 another New York case, in
which it was held that New York did not have to give recognition to a divorce
granted by a state which was not the matrimonial domicile, where there was no in
personam jurisdiction over both parties. As much as was possible within the limits
laid down in the Haddock case, however, New York retained its flexible recognition
policy until the rule became more or less settled by the two cases of Williams v. North
1
Carolina.
s
2 U. S. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1, cl. 1.
3 Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447, 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 778 (N. Y. 1829); Wheeler
v. Raymond, 8 Cow. 311 (U. S. 1830); Strauss v. Strauss, 122 App. Div. 729, 107
N. Y. Supp. 842 (1st Dep't 1907); Pierce v. Bristol, 130 Misc. 188, 223 N. Y. Supp.
678 (Sup. Ct. Steuben Co. 1927).
4 For a collection of these cases, see People v. Townsend, 133 Misc. 543, 233 N. Y.
Supp. 632 (Sup. Ct. Wash. Co. 1929).
5 STUMBERG, CoNucrT OF LAws 40 (2d ed. Brooklyn 1951).
6 4 R. I. 87 (1856).
7 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. Ed. 604 (U. S. 1870).
8 See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 S. Ct. 442, 58 L. Ed. 758 (1913).
9 Peole v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879).
10 Cf. De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890).
11 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933 (1898), rev'd 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed.
794 (1901).
12 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
13 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942); 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct.
1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945).
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In the first Williams case, which expressly overruled the Haddock case, the Supreme
Court reversed a state conviction for bigamy of two persons who had left their spouses
and obtained simultaneous Nevada divorces after service on the North Carolina
spouses by publication. This amounted to a holding that the guilty spouse, as well
as the innocent, might leave and take the matrimonial domicile with him for purposes
of divorce jurisdiction. In the second Williams case, the biganly conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court after the prosecution had proven to the satisfaction of the
state court that there had been no good faith domicile acquired in Nevada, a jurisdictional fact which the Supreme Court held to be triable de novo.
As a result of the Williams cases, New York had to modify still further its nonrecognition policies, but it retained the right to determine de novo the jurisdictional
facts in ex parte matrimonial actions. Prior to the Williams cases, the lower New York
courts had collaterally impeached foreign divorce decrees where jurisdiction of the
foreign court had been invoked by fraud. Thus, in Oblander v. Obander,14 it was
held that New York could inquire into the jurisdiction of the divorcing state, notwithstanding the full faith and credit clause, and could refuse to recognize a Nevada
decree obtained after the plaintiff husband induced his illiterate wife to sign a paper
which turned out to be a notice of appearance in the action.
Also, in Kozba v. Kozba, 15 an action brought by the wife for separate maintenance, it was held no defense to the husband that he had obtained an Ohio divorce,
where it was proven that the husband had falsely told the Ohio court that he did not
know the whereabouts of his wife. In Dean v. Dean,1 6 it was similarly held that the
plaintiff's fraud on the Pennsylvania court removed any prima fade obligation on the
New York court to give the decree full faith and credit.
The general rule applicable to all judgments in rem obtained after service by
publication is that, inasmuch as the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter (and
this is especially true today in matrimonial actions after the Williams cases), an irregularity in the service by publication is not necessarily fatal to the judgment.17
However, where the service, as in the instant case, is so colored by deliberate, blatant
fraud, the court, in exercising its right to try the jurisdictional facts de novo, will find
a lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court, and will refuse to give any effect to the decree.
Although the decision in the Hoyt case announces no new principles of law, it presented a fact situation which had apparently never been ruled upon, precisely, in New
York. This decision, applying existing principles of law, reaffirms the right of the courts
of one state to inquire broadly into the jurisdictional bases of a sister state's judgment, despite the constitutional mandate that such decrees be given prima facie validity.
179 Misc. 459, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 139 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N. Y. 1943).
15 160 Misc. 56, 289 N. Y. Supp. 632 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N. Y. 1936).
16 213 App. Div. 360, 126 Misc. 797 (4th Dep't 1925).
17 159 A. L. R. 569 N (1945).
14

